Analysis of Error Propagation Between Software Processes by Sizarta Sarshar
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors
Our authors are among the
most cited scientists
Downloads
We are IntechOpen,
the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books
Built by scientists, for scientists
12.2%
122,000 135M
TOP 1%154
4,800
4 
Analysis of Error Propagation  
Between Software Processes 
Sizarta Sarshar 
Institute for Energy Technology 
Norway 
1. Introduction 
All software systems can contain faults. In critical systems, this problem is alleviated by 
controlling the possible effects of a fault being executed, typically through techniques for 
achieving fault tolerance. Ensuring that failures are properly isolated, and not allowed to 
propagate, is essential when developing critical systems.  
In much of the research on error propagation analysis the focus has been on probabilistic 
models. While these models are well suited for quantitative analysis, they are usually not 
very specific with regard to the actual mechanisms that might allow a failure to propagate 
between entities. Quantitative analysis is often applied on code level and not seen as 
influenced by and in conjunction with the operating system. A more detailed insight into the 
actual mechanisms can be beneficial to decide whether or not error propagation is a concern 
for a given source code.  
A method for studying mechanisms of error propagation between software processes was 
proposed in (Sarshar, 2007). This chapter describes the method, which (1) facilitates the 
study of error propagation between software processes; (2) identifies mechanisms for error 
propagation; and (3) provides means to determine whether these can be automatically 
detected by a static analyser. In this context a process represents a program in execution, 
typically managed by an operating system. Processes can communicate with each other via 
inter-process communication and their shared resources. Examples of shared resources can 
be the operating system itself and the memory. The analysed problem is how one process 
can cause another process to fail and concerns interaction methods available in the source 
code of a program. The work criteria and scope are described in the following: 
• Consider processes running on a single CPU computer with an operating system. 
• The method should only require the source code and minimal manual input to work. 
• The source code must compile without any errors prior to the analysis. 
• The primary interest is to determine whether error propagation is a concern or not. 
This chapter further reports on the applicability of the method in a case where a module of a 
core surveillance framework named SCORPIO has been analysed. The framework is a 
support system for nuclear power plants supporting monitoring and prediction of core 
conditions.  
Some of the terminologies used in this chapter are briefly described in the following (Storey, 
1996): 
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• A fault – is a defect within the system. 
• An error – is a deviation from the required operation of the system or subsystem. 
• A system failure – occurs when the system fails to perform its required function. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a definition of error propagation, 
describes the mechanisms of error propagation, and previous work on the topic. Section 3 
describes the proposed method for studying error propagation between software processes. 
Section 4 reports on the applicability of the method on one module of the SCORPIO 
framework. Section 5 addresses the main results. Section 6 discusses the work while section 
7 provides conclusions and comments on future work.  
2. Background 
This section gives a definition of error propagation, describes the mechanisms of error 
propagation, operating systems and related work on the topic. 
2.1 Error propagation 
In our work, error propagation is defined as the situation where an error (or failure) 
propagates from one entity to another (Sarshar et al., 2007). Errors can propagate between 
different types of entities, including: physical entities, processes running on single or 
multiple CPUs, data objects in a database, functions in a program, and statements in a 
program. Our approach concerns propagation of errors between processes running on a 
single CPU computer. 
Systems of interest in our work have not been limited to those that are safety critical only, 
e.g. systems that are directly involved in controlling a nuclear reactor. A problem of 
particular interest is the possible negative effect a low criticality application might have on a 
higher criticality application by means of error propagation because they share common 
resources. 
Programs make use of interaction methods provided by the underlying operating system to 
communicate with each other, or make use of shared resources. These services are provided 
through the system call interface of the operating system, and are usually wrapped in 
functions available using standard libraries. Such interaction methods can cause errors and 
provide mechanisms for error propagation. A coding fault which may be manifested as an 
error may in principle be anything, e.g. an incorrect instruction or an erroneous data value. 
It may be manifested inside a local function or an external function. The propagated error 
need not be of the same type in different functions, e.g. an instruction error in one function 
realization causes a data error in another. Even if an error is propagated to one function, this 
does not necessarily mean that the source function fails functionally. The propagated error 
may only be a side-effect in this function. Another type of error related to function usage is 
error caused by passing illegal arguments to functions or misusing their return variables. 
Error propagation between two programs may occur even if both programs individually 
operate functionally correct. This can e.g. be caused by erroneous side effect in the 
implementation or execution of the programs. There are two situations possible for how one 
process can cause another process to fail: 
• One process experiences a failure, which then causes another process to fail. 
• One process propagates a fault to another process while not failing itself. 
According to (Fredriksen & Winther, 2007), possible ways of characterizing error 
propagation is as either intended or unintended communication or as resource conflicts. 
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Error propagation in intended communication channels might consist of erroneous data 
transfer through parameters or global variables. Writing to the wrong addresses in memory, 
due e.g. to faulty pointers, exemplifies error propagation through unintended channels. 
Processes that demand high processor load so that other processes cannot execute are 
examples of resource conflicts which could cause error propagation. This indicates that error 
propagation between functions can occur in at least two ways: 
• An error in one function is transferred via a communication channel to another 
function, for example through passing of arguments or return value. 
• The execution of one function interacts with another function in an unintended and 
incorrect way, due to an error, and causes the second function to fail. 
Thus error propagation can take place via the intended communication channels, i.e. those 
that are used by the set of functions to fulfil their tasks. It is also possible that an error in one 
function generates a communication channel that is not intended and propagates the error 
through this. 
2.2 Operating systems 
The references (Nutt, 2004; Bacon & Harris, 2003; Bic & Shaw, 2003; Tanenbaum & 
Woodhull, 2006; Stallings, 2005) cover the basic principles of a number of important 
operating systems. 
With respect to the Linux operating system and its kernel, one source to its understanding is 
given in (Bovet & Cesati, 2003). Here, the authors describe the kernel components from how 
they are built to how they work. (Beck et al., 2002) explains what is in the kernel, and how to 
write kernel code or a kernel module. The work in (Bic & Shaw, 2003) explains process 
management and interaction in the UNIX operating system, and in (Pinkert & Wear, 1989), 
the authors describe all major components of an operating system down to the pseudo code 
level. The authors employ a generic approach and present the fundamental concepts 
involved, alternative policies from which a designer can choose, and illustrative 
mechanisms for implementing selected policies. 
In (Kropp et al., 1998), the Ballista methodology is applied on several implementations of the 
POSIX operating system C language API. The methodology is for automatic creation and 
execution of invalid input robustness tests designed to detect crashes and hangs caused by 
invalid inputs to function calls. The Ballista POSIX robustness test suite was ported to ten 
operating systems where even in the best case, about half of the functions had at least one 
robustness failure. The results illustrate that error propagation is a concern in operating 
systems. 
A study of operating system errors found by automatic and static compiler analysis applied 
to the Linux and OpenBSD kernels is reported in (Chou et al., 2001). Static analysis is 
applied uniformly to the entire kernel source. The scope of errors in the study is limited to 
those found by their automatic tools. These bugs are mostly straightforward source-level 
errors. They do not directly track problems with performance, high-level design, user space 
programs, or other facets of a complete system. (Engler et al., 2000) examines features of 
operating system errors found automatically by compiler extensions. Some of the results 
they present include the distribution of errors in the kernel: the vast majority of bugs are in 
drivers.  
Our approach focuses on analysing user space programs. We examine how the operating 
system manages processes and provides services to user programs through the system call 
interface, but we do not analyse its code. We assume that the operating system performs its 
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intended functions correctly and that it is implemented correctly. Instead, we analyse the 
system call interface and other process interaction mechanisms to identify whether these 
may cause error propagation. 
2.3 Related work 
Error propagation analysis has to a large extent been focused on probabilistic approaches 
(Hiller et al., 2001, Jhumka et al., 2001; Nassar et al., 2004; Abdelmoez et al., 2004) and model 
based approaches (Voas, 1997; Michael & Jones, 1997; Goradia, 1993).  
In (Hiller et al., 2001), the concept of error permeability is introduced as a basic measure 
upon which a set of related measures is defined. These measures guide the process of 
analysing the vulnerability of software to find the modules that are most likely to propagate 
errors. Based on the analysis performed with error permeability and its related measures, 
how to select suitable locations for error detection mechanisms (EDMs) and error recovery 
mechanisms (ERMs) are described. Furthermore, a method for experimental estimation of 
error permeability, based in fault injection, is described and the software of a real embedded 
control system analysed to show the type of results obtainable by the analysis framework. 
The results show that the developed framework is very useful for analysing error 
propagation and software vulnerability, and for deciding where to place EDMs and ERMs. 
The paper (Jhumka et al., 2001), assess the impact of inter-modular error propagation 
between embedded software systems. They develop an analytical framework which enables 
to systematically design software modules so the inter-modular error propagation is 
reduced by design. The framework is developed using influence and separation metrics, 
then the framework is validated using fault injection experiments, which artificially inject 
faults and errors into the system. Influence metric is in their paper referred to as the 
probability of a module directly influencing another module, i.e., when no other module is 
considered while separation metric is referred to as the probability of a module not 
influencing another one when all other modules are considered. The results showed that the 
analytical framework can predict the influence value between a pair of modules very 
accurately. 
The study of software architectures is an important discipline in software engineering, due 
to its emphasis on large scale composition of software products, and its support for 
emerging software engineering paradigms such as product line engineering, component 
based software engineering, and software evolution. Architectural attributes differ from 
code-level software attributes in that they focus on the level of components and connectors, 
and that they are meaningful for architecture. In (Abdelmoez et al., 2004), focus is on a 
specific architectural attribute, which is the error propagation probability throughout the 
architecture, e.g. the probability that an error arising in one component propagates to other 
components. Formulas for estimating these probabilities using architectural level 
information are introduced, analysed, and validated.  
In (Voas, 1997), error propagation between commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components is 
analysed using an approach termed interface propagation analysis (IPA). IPA is a fault-
injection based technique for injecting ’garbage’ into the interfaces between components and 
then observing how that garbage propagates through the system. An example, if component 
A produces information that is input to component B, then the information is corrupted 
using fault injection techniques. This simulates the failure of component A. After this 
corrupt information is passed into B, IPA analyses the behaviour of B (or components 
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executed after B) to the information. IPA analyses the behaviour of a component by looking 
for specific outputs that the user wants to be on the lookout for. 
(Michael & Jones, 1997) presents an empirical study of an important aspect of software 
defect behaviour: the propagation of data-state errors. A data-state error occurs when a fault 
is executed and affects a program’s data-state, and it is said to propagate if it affects the 
outcome of the execution. The results show that data-state errors appear to have a property 
that is quite useful when simulating faulty code: for a given input, it appears that either all 
data state errors injected at a given location tends to propagate to the output, or else none of 
them do. These results are interesting, because of what they indicate about the behaviour of 
data-state errors in software. They suggest that data state errors behave in an orderly way, 
and that the behaviour of software may not be as unpredictable as it could theoretically be. 
Additionally, if all faults behave the same for a given input and a given location, then one 
can use simulation to get a good picture of how faults behave, regardless of whether the 
simulated faults are representative of real faults. 
Goradia (Goradia, 1993) addresses test effectiveness, i.e. the ability of a test to detect faults. 
This thesis suggests an analytical approach, introducing a technique of dynamic impact 
analysis using impact graphs to estimate the error propagation behaviour of various 
potential sources of errors in the execution. The empirical results in the thesis provide 
evidence indicating a strong correlation between impact strength and error propagation. 
The time complexity of dynamic impact analysis is shown to be linear with respect to the 
original execution time and experimental measurements indicate that the constant 
proportionality is a small number ranging from 2.5 to 14.5. Together these results indicate 
that they have been fairly successful in their goal of designing a cost effective technique to 
estimate error propagation. However, they also indicate that to reach the full potential 
benefits of the technique the accuracy of the estimate needs to be improved significantly. In 
particular, better heuristics are needed for handling reference impact and program 
components tolerant to errors in control paths. 
Research on error propagation has identified frameworks and techniques for estimating 
error propagation, e.g. in (Jhumka et al., 2001; Goradia, 1993). In difference, our goal is to 
identify sources and mechanisms for error propagation in order to identify potential error 
propagation scenarios and remove the failures to improve software. 
3. Method of analysis 
A method for analysing the interfaces between processes and their shared resources in the 
search for mechanisms for error propagation is provided in (Sarshar, 2007; Sarshar et al., 
2007). This section describes this method which starts out by investigating how processes 
are managed in the relevant operating system, enabling us to identify process characteristics 
relevant to error propagation. The output of this step includes a list of system calls in the 
system call interface of the operating system. Secondly, the identified interaction methods 
are analysed using Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) (Stamatis, 1995). This 
approach helps to identify types of code characteristics that might be a concern in relation to 
error propagation. The method of analysis can be summarized in three steps:  
1. Examination of the operating system for how it interacts with and manages processes to 
obtain an overview of e.g. a list of system calls and common resources;  
2. Analysis of the interaction methods using Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) to 
identify possible faults that can cause error propagation to occur; and  
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3. Determination of how the mechanisms can be recognized in source code. 
The method was developed for C code under the Linux operating system as a case. C was 
chosen because it is a widely used programming language and Linux because it is an open 
source operating system. In section 4, the method is applied on one module of the SCORPIO 
framework. 
3.1 How processes run in operating systems 
Processes are managed by the operating system. An operating system provides a variety of 
services that programs can utilise using special instructions called system calls. The typical 
functions of an operating systems kernel are: process management, memory management, 
input and output management, and support functions. In Linux, the kernel components 
managing processes are the following: 
• Signals: the kernel uses signals to call into a process. 
• System calls (explained below). 
• Process manager and scheduler: creates, manages and schedules processes. 
• Virtual memory: allocates and manages virtual memory for processes. 
A process interface to the operating system is either a result of the use of system calls or 
through direct memory access. Use of a pointer in the C language is an example of accessing 
memory without the use of the system call interface. In Linux, system calls are implemented 
in the kernel. When a program makes a system call, the arguments are handled in the 
kernel, which takes over the execution of the program until the call completes (Mitchell et 
al., 2001). System calls are usually wrapped in the standard C library and may require some 
parameters and return a value. Examples of system calls are low-level input and output 
functions, such as open() and read(). The system calls of Linux can be grouped into the 
following categories (Silberschatz et al., 2005; Bic & Shaw, 2003): 
• Process management: create/terminate process, load, execute, end, abort, get/set 
process attributes, wait for time, wait/signal event, allocate and free memory. 
• File management: create/delete file, open, close, read, write, reposition, get/set file 
attributes. 
• Device management: request/release device, read, write, reposition, get/set attributes, 
logically attach or detach device. 
• Inter-process communication: the transfer of data among processes. 
• Communications: create, delete connection, end, receive messages, transfer status 
information, attach or detach remote device. 
• Miscellaneous services: get/set time or date, system data. 
The essence of our approach is to identify mechanisms for error propagation that have 
characteristics detectable when analysing source code. We can therefore narrow down our 
scope to include those parts of the operating system which fulfil this requirement. The 
kernel components that allow interaction directly in source code of a program include the 
system call interface and signals. Language specific traps and pitfalls (Hatton, 1995; Koenig, 
1989) might also open ways for an error to propagate. Programming errors can give 
variables incorrect values that can lead to failures. Our analysis does not specifically address 
general programming errors, but errors related to invoking system calls. 
We focus here on programs written to run in user space, and exclude programs written for 
kernel space, as they have their own kernel API which provide services for kernel 
programming.  
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Figure 1 shows a simple illustration of the channels available in source code of a program 
for interaction with the operating system and its resources. These include the system call 
interface, signals, and traps and faults, with arrows indicating the interactions. 
 
Hardware
Operating system
System call interface Signals
CPU
Traps & Faults
Exceptions
ReturnSystem call Signal
Source code of a program
Language faults
I/O
Interrupts
Interrupt 
handler
Event
 
Fig. 1. Illustration of the interaction methods of the operating system on processes 
An interrupt is a condition that can cause the normal execution of instructions to be altered. 
Interrupts and exceptions are known as signals and are used to notify a process of certain 
faults by the kernel (Pinkert & Wear, 1989): 
• Completion of an input or output operation. 
• Division by zero. 
• Arithmetic overflow or underflow. 
• Arrival of a message from another system. 
• Passage of an amount of time. 
• Power failure. 
• Memory parity error. 
• Memory protect violation. 
A signal might also be altered from another program using the system call interface.  
In source code, interaction with the operating system is only available through the system 
call interface. It is therefore not necessary to examine how processes are handled and 
managed at deeper levels. 
3.2 Identify system call failures causing error propagation 
In the proposed method, each system call is analysed using FMEA. The purpose is to 
identify failure modes that can cause errors to propagate to other processes or the operating 
system. The focus in this analysis is on failure modes that have characteristics in the source 
code of a program.  
FMEA is a well-known analysis method for risk and reliability analysis. The basis for this 
analysis is a description of a system in terms of its components and the communication 
between them. For each of the components in the system, the aim is to identify all potential 
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modes of failure, by investigating the following questions for each component and 
communication unit, based on the FMEA framework: 
• What can go wrong? (failure mode) 
• How can this occur? (failure cause/mechanism) 
• Which consequences will this have on the further actions and messages? (failure effects 
via error propagation) 
In our method, the FMEA is targeted on the system call as a component and the focus is on 
its usage in source code of a program. Once the failure modes have been identified, we 
determine their potential effects on local and system processes to determine whether any of 
these can cause error propagation. This can be done in two ways: 
• The effect is described in the system call documentation as an error the function can 
return. 
• The effect is determined using fault injection in test programs. 
The failure effects will provide information on the severity of failures and help us provide 
possible mitigation actions.  
3.3 Identify the failure mode characteristics in source code 
The aim of step three of the method is to determine whether the failure modes identified in 
the previous step are present in the source code of a program. For each failure mode that can 
cause error propagation, we determine its characteristics in code so it can be detected when 
analysing an application’s source code. We then examine some existing code analysis tools 
to check whether any of these will recognise the failure modes, and if they do, determine 
whether they identify all of them. The next step is to develop an algorithm for identifying 
the failure modes in source code, including how to traverse and check the code for the 
identified failures. The result is a prototype tool which demonstrates that failures causing 
error propagation can be detected by analysing source code. 
The steps of the method are performed only once for an operating system and programming 
language combination. The prototype tool is run for each application source code we wish 
to analyse for error propagation. 
4. Case on SCORPIO 
SCORPIO (Surveillance of reactor CORe by Picture On-line display) is a core surveillance 
framework for nuclear power plants, and is developed at the Institute for Energy 
Technology (IFE). The framework is a support system for the monitoring and prediction of 
pressurized water reactors (PWR), boiling water reactors (BWR) and VVER (Russian design 
series of PWRs) core conditions and is running on several reactors worldwide (Barmsnes et 
al., 1997). The framework has passed established system tests including factory acceptance 
testing and site acceptance testing.  
The general SCORPIO framework is illustrated in Figure 2. The module administrator is a 
program that connects the modules to the graphical user interface made using ProcSee (IFE, 
2010). ProcSee is a versatile software tool for developing and displaying dynamic graphical 
user interfaces, particularly aimed at process monitoring and control. All data exchanged 
between the modules and the operator is transmitted through this program. The Software 
Bus handles the communication between all modules. In the case study, the input data 
processing (IDATP) module of the framework has been assessed. The IDATP module 
consists of 30 files and approximately 5300 lines of code. 
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Fig. 2. The general SCORPIO framework 
The source code of the IDATP module is first examined to identify which calls it performs to 
system and library functions. The attributes passed to these external functions and the 
values retrieved are stored for later analysis. 
 
Function System call Library call Description 
close x  Close a file descriptor 
execvp  x Execute file 
fclose  x Close a stream file 
fopen  x Open a stream file; convert file to stream 
fprintf  x 
Formatted output conversion to a given 
stream 
fscanf  x Input format conversion 
memcpy  x 
Copies n bytes from memory area source 
to memory area destination 
memset  x Fill memory with a constant byte 
pipe x  Creates a pair of file descriptors 
printf  x 
Formatted output conversion to 
standard out stream 
shmget x  Allocate a new shared memory segment 
signal x  Signal handling 
sprintf  x 
Formatted output conversion to a given 
character string 
sscanf  x Input format conversion 
strcat  x Concatenate two strings 
strcmp  x Compare two strings 
strlcpy  x Copy string 
strlen  x Calculate  length of string 
strncmp  x Compare two strings 
Table 1. Analysed system and library calls 
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4.1 Applying the analysis 
Each system and library function of the IDATP module is analysed using FMEA with focus 
on identifying failure modes that can cause the module or the system itself to encounter 
failure. A failure mode specifies how an entity may fail. An entity may be e.g. a variable, 
used as either an argument passed to a function or used as a return variable.  
The system manuals for these calls form the basis for this analysis. The IDATP module 
makes use of several system and library calls. A subset of 19 of these functions, listed in 
Table 1, were analysed using FMEA.  
To exemplify the analysis, we focus on the shmget() system call to demonstrate the usage of 
the method in the following. Thus emphasis is on the steps involved in performing the 
analysis and understanding the analysis object.  
The shmget() system call creates or allocates a new shared memory segment for inter-
process communication (IPC) between processes. This IPC provides a channel for 
communication between processes using the memory. The main services related to shared 
memory are shmget(), shmat(), shmctl(), and shmdt(). Other calls related to shared memory 
include services for managing semaphores. The relation between these calls are as follows: 
A process starts by issuing a shmget() system call to create a new shared memory with the 
required size. After obtaining the IPC resource identifier, the process invokes the shmat() 
system call, which returns the starting address of the new region within the process address 
space. When the process wishes to detach the shared memory from its address space, it 
invokes the shmdt() system call. 
We begin with an examination of the system call documentation and then perform FMEA 
on the function. When performing the analysis, the aim is to identify failure modes caused 
by wrong usage of the service in source code, and determine their effects on local and 
system processes. The focus is on those failure modes causing error propagation. 
The synopsis for the shmget() function: 
 
# include <sys/types.h> 
int shmget(key_t key, size_t size, int shmflg); 
 
The shmget() function returns the identifier of the shared memory segment associated with 
the value of the argument key. A new shared memory segment, with size equal to the value 
of size rounded up to a multiple of PAGE_SIZE, is created if: 
• key has the value IPC_PRIVATE, or 
• key is not IPC_PRIVATE, no shared memory segment corresponding to key exists, and 
IPC_CREAT is specified in shmflg 
PAGE_SIZE, IPC_PRIVATE and IPC_CREAT are definitions within the operating system. 
IPC_PRIVATE is not a flag field but a key_t type. If this special value is used for key the 
system call ignores everything but the least significant 9 bits of shmflg and creates a new 
shared memory segment, on success. The value of shmflg’s least significant 9 bits specify the 
permission mode, the permissions granted to the owner, group, and world. 
The FMEA process starts with identifying failure modes. Table 2 illustrates identified failure 
modes for the shmflg parameter of shmget(). This is an excerpt from the complete FMEA 
sheet for this function. 
For each identified failure mode, we now examine its effects on the process itself (indicates 
“local effect” in the FMEA sheet) and on other processes (indicates “system effect” in the 
FMEA form). Some of these failure modes are detected by the system call; the function exits 
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with return value equal to -1, which indicates an error, and the external variable errno is set 
appropriately. Many of these are described in the manual pages and can be identified as the 
failure effect on the local process. However, not all failure modes are represented as error 
cases in the manual pages. We make use of test programs to identify these. 
 
Reference Variable Failure mode 
F.29.3.A Parameter shmflg Not specified at all 
F.29.3.B Parameter shmflg 
Is not one of IPC_CREAT, IPC_EXCL, SHM_HUGETLB 
or SHM_NORESERVE 
F.29.3.C Parameter shmflg Is of wrong type 
F.29.3.D Parameter shmflg No permission mode is set 
F.29.3.E Parameter shmflg 
Access permission is given to all users, instead of user 
only 
F.29.3.F Parameter shmflg Permission mode is write when it should have been  read 
F.29.3.G Parameter shmflg Permission mode is read when it should have been write 
F.29.3.H Parameter shmflg Permission mode is set without user access 
F.29.3.I Parameter shmflg IPC_EXCL specified without IPC_CREAT 
F.29.3.J Parameter shmflg 
Wrong flag specified i.e. IPC_CREAT | IPC_EXCL when 
not intended 
Table 2. Failure modes for parameter shmflg for the shmget() system call 
A test program is written to execute a failure mode while the failure effect is monitored. 
Such test programs have the possibility to execute an injected failure mode.  
Based on such test programs one can determine the effect of failure modes. E.g. the effect for 
failure mode F.29.3.D ”no permission mode is set” was determined to be: no processes can 
access the shared memory segment unless they are privileged. Checking the value of the 
parameter shmflg to identify whether the permission mode is set is easily done performing 
static analysis, thus this failure mode can be detected in source code.  
Table 3 shows the complete FMEA for the failure modes related to the shmflg parameter of 
shmget() from Table 2.  
Similarly, the remaining system and library calls are analysed. The failure modes identified 
in the analysis of these calls are related to passing of arguments and handling return values, 
and can be grouped as follows: 
• Argument refers to uninitialized variable/pointer. 
• Argument is of different type than specified in function definition. 
• Argument refers to null-pointer. 
• Argument is freed. 
• Argument refers outside an arrays size. 
• Argument is an array of chars which is not null-terminated when required. 
• Return value is not retrieved from a non-void function. 
• Return value is not checked to determine successful call. 
• Return value is not used in scope. 
These failure modes are then compared with the checks that existing tools perform to 
determine whether any of these are present in their checks. 
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Ref. Failure mode Local effect System effect Conclusion 
F.29.3.A Not specified at all - - Does not compile 
F.29.3.B Is not one of 
IPC_CREAT, 
IPC_EXCL, 
SHM_HUGETLB or 
SHM_NORESERVE 
Unknown flag and 
permission is set 
Segment may not 
be created or 
accessed 
Detectability in 
source code must 
be determined 
F.29.3.C Is of wrong type Uses the int value 
of the type if 
possible, unknown 
flag and 
permissions are 
set on segment 
Segment may not 
be created or 
accessed 
Detectable in 
source code 
F.29.3.D No permission mode is 
set 
The process 
cannot access the 
shared memory 
segment unless it 
is run in 
privileged mode 
Other processes 
cannot access the 
shared memory 
segment unless 
they are run in 
privileged mode 
Detectable in 
source code 
F.29.3.E Access permission is 
given to all users, 
instead of user only 
- Other users can 
access the shared 
segment 
Detectability in 
source code must 
be determined 
F.29.3.F Permission mode is 
write when it should 
have been  read 
Can write to 
segment when not 
intended 
Other processes 
can write to 
segment when 
not intended 
Detectability in 
source code must 
be determined 
F.29.3.G Permission mode is 
read when it should 
have been write 
Cannot write to 
segment 
Other processes 
cannot write to 
segment 
Detectability in 
source code must 
be determined 
F.29.3.H Permission mode is set 
without user access 
The process 
cannot access the 
shared segment 
unless it is run in 
privileged mode 
- Detectable in 
source code 
F.29.3.I IPC_EXCL specified 
without IPC_CREAT 
Exits with error if 
segment already 
exists 
- Detectable in 
source code 
F.29.3.J Wrong flag specified 
i.e. IPC_CREAT | 
IPC_EXCL when not 
intended 
Tries to create 
instead of getting 
identifier for the 
shared segment 
- Detectability in 
source code must 
be determined 
Table 3. Example of FMEA for the parameter shmflg of the shmget() system call 
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4.2 Analysis tools 
There are several existing analysis tools which identify different types of errors. These tools 
include both static and dynamic analysis methods. In (Sarshar, 2007), over 20 tools were 
examined and compared to determine what kind of errors they detect. Of these tools, one 
group performs checks on passing of arguments, another group warns if a return value is 
not retrieved and a third group warns about sequential issues. The tool Splint (Secure 
Programming Lint, 2008) was the only tool which gave warnings on all three groups. 
Therefore, Splint was chosen for assessment of our source code in part three. None of the 
tools performed checks on argument values and they did not check all argument types to be 
correct.  
Based on the available documentation on existing analysis tools, we assume that some 
tools can check arguments and some tools can check the return value for the following 
issues: 
• Types – assignment of variables, passing arguments of different type than function 
expects. 
• Null pointers – a common cause of failures is when a null pointer is dereferenced. 
• Definitions – all function parameters and global variables used by a function must be 
defined before a call, and the return value must be defined after the call. 
• Allocations – concerns: reallocating storage when there are other live references to the 
same storage, or failing to reallocate storage before the last reference to it is lost. 
• Aliasing – program errors often result when there us unexpected aliasing between 
parameters, return value, and global variables. 
An important difference between the identified failure modes from the FMEA and the 
checks existing tools perform is to check a variable value in the context of the relevant 
function it is passed to. E.g. the system call shmget() has an argument of type size_t; As a 
data type, the variable must be checked to be of correct type and its value must be checked 
to be within the variable limits. Most existing analysis tools do these checks. But, in the 
context of the function the argument is passed to, the variable must be checked to determine 
e.g. whether its value is smaller than the maximum size of a shared memory segment (set by 
the operating system). 
The next step was to assess the source code for the identified failure modes that existing 
tools do not check for. To automate this process, we made use of a prototype tool described 
in (Sarshar & Winther, 2008). The tool was modified for this study and its purpose was to 
identify different attributes for each argument that was passed to a given function. If 
statically detectable, the following attributes were determined; the argument type, value, 
name, whether it was an array and if so, its size. This information was used as input to 
check the arguments for the potential failure modes. Several of these checks were 
automated; however, a majority was done manually by examination of the argument 
attributes against the FMEA sheets for each function. 
Splint was also applied on the source code of our case study with the checks described in the 
list above. However, the tool can also do more powerful checks enabled by source code 
annotations. Annotations are stylized comments that documents assumptions about 
functions, variables, parameters and types and follow a predefined syntax. To use the more 
powerful checks, the source code must be edited to add notations. This requires time and 
effort and was not applied in this case study. The use of annotations for more powerful 
checks applies to most static analysis tools. 
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5. Results 
A subset of 19 external calls has been analysed using FMEA to identify potential failure 
modes that can cause a process to fail or propagate error. The examined functions were 
called 309 places in the source code. 
In 242 of the cases, the return value from an external call was not retrieved or checked. In 
general, the return value often indicates whether a function succeeded or failed for some 
reason. If such failure is not handled, unexpected runtime errors can occur in a software 
system. As an example, consider an application which writes some data to a file regularly. 
The file is opened for reading successfully and the write function is called without checking 
its return value. If the file was inaccessible (e.g. lost connection to server) the write function 
would return a value indicating an error. If the error is not handled explicitly, a runtime 
error may occur. Such an error often causes the operating system to give an error message to 
the user and then terminates the application that caused the error. All unsaved data will be 
lost in such events. However, not all calls are this crucial; it is more vital that the return 
value from an open or write function is handled than the return value of a print to screen 
function. 76 of the ignored return cases were for a print function. 
Several of the examined functions had potential failure modes regarding the content of 
arguments they receive. In example, char arrays passed to a group of functions must be null-
terminated and for another group they must not contain a given character. Our assessment 
of the code did not identify any of these failure modes in the module. 
The source code was also assessed using the tool Splint which gave near 2000 warnings on 
the source code of the module. Table 4 (Sarshar, 2009) presents warnings given by Splint 
and number of instances. In general, the tool reports many false positive warnings (which 
add noise to the results and make it harder to spot the real problems). Though the number 
of cases for the warnings on incompatible types and dangerous comparison are equal, there 
is no relation between them. 
 
Warning on Cases 
Incompatible types 444 
Dangerous comparison 444 
Variable declared but not used 50 
Value used before definition 160 
Variable initialized to null value 14 
Dangerous assignments 237 
Test expression issues 163 
Storage not released before return 37 
Return value ignored 212 
Possible buffer overflow with sprintf() 23 
Arrow access of non-pointer 54 
Other warnings 162 
 
Table 4. Group of warnings given by the tool Splint 
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Assessment of many existing systems in the industry can only be performed on the available 
source code, and often, the specification is not available. This is where static analysis is 
useful, some tools only need the source code to perform their analysis. However, if 
annotations are necessary to perform an assessment, expertise on the system is required.  
The method proposed to use FMEA on system calls to identify potential failure modes and 
then assess the source code for these potential failures. The intention was not to develop yet 
another tool, therefore the identified failure modes were checked against the ones that 
existing tools check. An interesting approach would be, if possible, to write these failure 
modes as additional checks for existing tools. A disadvantage of the FMEA analysis is that it 
only identifies a small fraction of the potential failure modes and it requires expert 
knowledge on the system calls. 
System and library calls are complex functions which interact with the kernel of the 
operating system. The process of analysing such functions takes time and effort, but it only 
needs to be performed once for each function. The result from this analysis indicates that it 
is necessary to examine the source code of applications for failures related to system call 
usage. 
The source code of the input data processing module of the SCORPIO framework was 
assessed using our approach and using the tool Splint. The user of analysis tools must be 
critical to the results as all vulnerabilities are not guaranteed to be found, and identified 
vulnerabilities are not all real problems. Splint gave a lot of warnings which were false 
positives while the checks from the FMEA performed by us gave few false positives. The 
reason for this is that we used a prototype tool to help us identify variable attributes, but the 
checks were done manually. Performing manual checks is time consuming, but reduces the 
chance of false positives since the analyser is required to have insight of the application. 
Furthermore, it is difficult, if not impossible, to control and check the value of variables that 
are passed to system services when performing static analysis. 
Through the process of analysing the source code of the module, failure modes with the 
potential to cause harm at runtime as an effect of fault triggering and error propagation 
have been identified. These failure modes are related to usage of services provided by the 
underlying operating system. Though the arguments sent to such functions are valid and in 
accordance with the documentation, the majority of the potential failure modes detected in 
the code were related to handling of return values from these functions. 
We did not expect that this assessment would identify any serious failures in the code, and 
the result demonstrates that this expectation is valid. Potential failures related to usage of 
operating system services would have been identified using our method and none of the 
potential failures identified is likely to cause the module to fail. However, taking these 
results into account in new releases of the module will reduce its vulnerability. 
6. Discussion 
The methodology was applied on a subset of system calls, some of them related to shared 
memory. This target was found to be suitable because it involved an intended channel for 
communication between processes through a shared resource; the memory. We also 
performed FMEA on other system calls to evaluate whether the method is applicable to a 
wider class of functions and not restricted to those related to shared memory. The errors 
identified in this approach are erroneous values in the variables passed to the system call 
interface and errors caused when return, or modified, pointer variables are not handled 
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properly. From the analysis we know not only which functions behave non-robustly, but 
also the specific input that results in errors and exceptions being thrown by the operating 
system. This simplifies identification of the characteristics an error has in code, making it 
easier to locate errors. 
The method for analysing error propagation between processes primarily focuses on how 
the process of interest can interact with and affect the environment (the operating system 
and other processes). A complementary approach could be to analyse how a process can be 
affected by its (execution) environment. In (Johansson et al., 2007), the authors inject faults 
in the interface between drivers and the operating system, and then monitor the effect of 
these faults in the application layer. This is an example where processes in the application 
layer are affected by their execution environment. Comparing this method to our approach, 
it is clear that both methods make use of fault injection to determine different types of 
failure effects on user programs. However, the examination in (Johansson et al., 2007) only 
concerns incorrect values passed from the driver interface to the operating system. Passing 
of incorrect values from one component to another is a mechanism for error propagation 
and relates to problems for intended communication channels. Fault injection is just one 
method to evaluate process robustness in regards to incorrect values in arguments. In our 
work, we examine the failure effects of several mechanisms: passing of arguments and 
return values, usage of return values, system-wide limitations, and sequential issues. These 
methods complement each other. 
Understanding the failure and error propagation mechanisms in software-based systems 
will provide the knowledge to develop defences and avoid such mechanisms in software. It 
is therefore important to be aware of the limitations for the proposed approach. This 
analysis only identifies failure modes related to the usage of system calls in source code. 
Other mechanisms for error propagation that do not involve usage of the system call 
interface will not be covered by this approach. This approach, however, complements 
existing methods and static analysis tools. An infinite loop structure in code is one example 
of a failure mode that does not make use of system calls. This failure mode can cause error 
propagation because it uses a lot of CPU time/resources. 
The FMEA method worked well on system calls and identified failure modes that could 
cause error propagation between processes. However, the identified failure modes from the 
FMEA do not apply directly to other operating systems. A new analysis must be performed 
for a new programming language and operating system combination. Even though several 
operating systems provide the same functionality, e.g. usage of shared memory, the 
implementation of the service will be different. Thus, some of the failure modes may be 
similar, yet their effects may not. And, in contrast to general FMEA approaches which 
analyse functionality of software systems, our aim was to identify failure modes related to 
the interaction of a program with operating system services. 
7. Conclusion  
The analysis and results from this case shows that the approach facilitates the detection of 
potential failure modes related to the use of the system calls in operating systems. However, 
this is without further analysis about their actual impact in the SCORPIO framework. Future 
extension of the work can include examining the potential impact of these failure modes. 
With so many potential failure modes it also seems that there needs to be some way to 
prioritize or target the “important” failures that should be fixed based on the study. For 
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example, the missing return values seem to become critical errors only under maintenance, 
if the return values can change. Even though this is valuable to uncover, it would be more 
valuable to quantify which potential failures would be critical if they occurred under the 
current operational mode and which would not. This would help to indicate the usefulness 
of the technique and provide some evidence that the failures occur with sufficient frequency 
to justify the definition of a technique that targets them. Further extension of the work can 
include exploring alternative techniques or quantify effort required to conduct this type of 
analysis to make it easier to determine the trade-offs of using this technique in practice, 
providing a quantitative analysis of the types of failure modes the analysis uncover and 
providing usage guidelines to the practitioner. 
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